


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
CONFIDENTIAL

14 December 1950



MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Memorandum for information entitled
"Soviet Reaction to a US Declaration
of National Emergency"



1. Pursuant to our telephone conversation of this morning, there are attached hereto twenty copies of above-entitled memorandum for your dissemination to the IAC and such other action as you deem advisable.

25X1



Assistant Director
National Estimates

Enclosures:
Copies #1 through 20
of 53026

Document No.	4
No Change in Class.	<input type="checkbox"/>
<input type="checkbox"/> Declassified	
Class. Changed by	1990
Next Review Date	1990
Auth:	100-20-0
Date:	5/07/80


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
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MEMORANDUM TO: General Smith

Shall I have distribution made of the
enclosures to the attached memorandum to the
members of the IAC?



JSE



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(DATE)

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SOVIET REACTION TO A US DECLARATION OF NATIONAL EMERGENCY

1. The USSR is aware that its policies are causing mounting concern in the US and, at least since the outbreak of the Korean war, are producing increasing US military preparations. The proclamation of a US national emergency, therefore, would hardly come as a complete surprise to Soviet leaders and such a possibility has probably been considered by Soviet planners. The announcement would not, immediately and of itself, produce any major Soviet reaction. The Kremlin would await evidence of the effects and implications of the announcement and probably would not alter materially its present plans unless the announcement was followed by concrete steps toward large-scale US mobilization.

2. If the USSR intends to initiate global war in the near future (within six to eighteen months), large-scale US mobilization probably would result merely in an adjustment of the Soviet time-table. The USSR would time its attack to take advantage of its optimum relative preparedness and to anticipate the date at which US mobilization measures began to produce major results.

3. It is doubtful that a Soviet decision to initiate global war has been reached. It may be assumed that Soviet leaders will be reluctant to jeopardize the achievements of the Communist revolution, the power base of world Communism, their own positions in the Soviet hierarchy, and their personal security. They will hardly gamble for the higher stakes of war until convinced that major gains can be achieved thereby and that the less dangerous and less costly means of Communist expansion have been exhausted. The Soviet Orbit has, however, achieved a highly advanced state of war readiness. Short-term

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war preparations, especially in the Eastern European Satellites and in the Far East, have been accelerated in a manner suggesting that the possibility of war in 1951 is being considered. These preparations, the apparent boldness of current Soviet and Communist policy, and the present relative weakness of Western defenses require that an early and direct Soviet attack be considered a definite and continuing possibility.

4. If the USSR does not intend deliberately to initiate a global war in the near future, but estimates that the US is likely to do so, large-scale US mobilization might result either in a last-minute Soviet effort to reduce this likelihood by offering substantial concessions, or in a Soviet attempt to anticipate the West by an early attack on the US or its allies, as the alternative to making concessions which would reduce this likelihood.

5. It is improbable that the USSR expects an early attack by the US. Soviet leaders probably appreciate, and may well exaggerate, their ability to reduce international tension and forestall a possible Western attack through concessions and ostentatious displays of good will. Furthermore, while perhaps hypersensitive to any real or imaginary threats from abroad, and apprehensive of US atomic and technical capabilities, the Kremlin appears to regard mass armies as a decisive factor in military success, and is therefore unlikely to consider US military force in being as a serious threat.

6. If the USSR neither intends itself to initiate a global war in the near future nor expects the US to do so, large-scale US mobilization probably would not immediately cause the USSR to reverse its intention. Soviet leaders probably would take advantage of the period between the US announcement and the first concrete results of the program to study its effects and implications.

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During this period the USSR probably would accelerate its own military preparations and intensify its efforts to divide and weaken the Western Powers by:

- (a) Playing upon the war fears of the Western Europeans in the hope of thus alienating them from the US;
- (b) Extending "peace" overtures and diplomatic feelers for four-power conversations, for separate Soviet accords with individual Western nations, and for disarmament discussions in the UN;
- (c) Directing further local Communist aggression in the Far East or elsewhere in an effort to divert US attention and resources from Europe.

If US mobilization measures promise early and material improvement in the relative US power position, and the Western Allies appear united and firm, Soviet tactics may change, and the Kremlin might then either:

- (a) Ostensibly soften its policy, and perhaps offer material concessions to the West in an effort to reduce international tension, forestall the completion of US preparations, disorganize the US economy, and gain credit for the USSR as the champion of peace; or
- (b) Launch an immediate Soviet attack on the US or its allies, estimating either that a US decision to attack the Soviet Union had been reached or that the successful completion of US mobilization measures would constitute an intolerable threat to Soviet security or to the attainment of ultimate Soviet objectives.

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